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Abstract
We derive the backward-looking Keynesian wage-price spiral from micro-
foundations. The optimal price Phillips curve features one lag of price ina-
tion, the lag of the labour share, excess demand pressure, speed-limit e¤ects
and supply shocks. The wage Phillips curve features current and lagged price
ination, excess demand pressure up to the second lag, and the lag of nominal
wage ination. We estimate this model for six developed and emerging mar-
ket economies and nd that the model ts the data well. In general, nominal
wages are more exible than prices with respect to demand pressure. The
baseline model rejects the inclusion of supply shocks and indexation of wages
in developed economies and some emerging markets.
Keywords: microfoundations, wage and price Phillips curves, forward and
backward-looking behaviour.
JEL Codes: E12, E24, E31, E32.
1. Introduction
This paper provides the microfoundations for the backward-looking Keyne-
sian wage-price spiral similar to that of Chiarella and Flaschel (2000), Fair
(2000, 2008), Flaschel et.al.(2001) and Asada et.al.(2006). Fuhrer (1995)
notes that one of the major criticisms of the Phillips curve is its lack of mi-
crofoundations. Since then, new Keynesian economists, e.g. Gali and Gertler
(1999), formulated a Phillips curve relation from microfoundations thereby
providing theoretical grounds for "the return of the Phillips curve" as noted
0Email: christopher.malikane@wits.ac.za. Tel: +27-11-717-8109. Fax: +27-11-717-
8081.
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by Gali (2000). Their optimisation procedure yields a relation in which cur-
rent ination is determined by expected future ination and marginal cost.
Further developments of the new Keynesian Phillips produced a hybrid for-
mulation that features both forward and backward-looking ination terms,
under the assumption of price indexation.
Despite its microfoundations, the success of the new Keynesian Phillips curve
in describing ination dynamics remains elusive and the econometrics that
support it has been a source of debate. In relation to the econometric aspects,
a major problem with the new Keynesian Phillips curve has been that of
identication. Bardsen et.al. (2004), Mavroeidis (2004, 2005) and Martins
and Gabriel (2009) nd that the new Keynesian Phillips curve is weakly
identied. Another set of problems relate to the signicance and the sign
of the marginal cost variable. Rudd and Whelan (2005, 2007) nd that
the forcing variable exhibits insignicance and sometimes a negative sign in
the case of the US. In the case of the Euro-Area, Mazumder (2012) nds
an insignicant and negative sign for the forcing variable. Similarly Abbas
and Sgro (2012) estimate the new Keynesian equation for Australia and nd
insignicant and negative signs. In relation to forecast performance Gordon
(2011) nds that the new Keynesian model delivers poor results compared
to the triangle model, while Fair (2008) nds that the new Keynesian model
is the worst performer compared to the triangle model and the wage-price
spiral.
In his econometric analysis Fuhrer (1995) nds that the traditional, backward-
looking Phillips curve, seems to do well in describing the data. In addition
the backward-looking Phillips curve is robust to the Lucas critique. Gordon
(2011) also nds that the triangle model with the time-varying NAIRU de-
scribes the data very well. Another strand of the Phillips curve literature
maintains the relevance of the wage Phillips curve in describing ination dy-
namics. Fair (2000, 2008), Chiarella and Flaschel (2000), Flaschel et.al.
(2001) and Asada et.al. (2006) argue that reduced-form formulations such as
the new Keynesian Phillips curve and triangle model do not provide adequate
descriptions of the ination process. Despite their empirical success, the
problem with the backward-looking triangle and wage-price Phillips curves
is that they are not based on microfoundations.
The new Keynesian literature has since moved to incorporate wage dynamics
into the ination process. For example, Sbordone (2001), Erceg et.al. (2000),
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Huang and Liu (2002), Woodford (2003, Chapter 3), Gertler et.al.(2008) and
Gali (2011) provide microfoundations for "the return of the wage Phillips
curve". New Keynesian wage-price Phillips curves are now standard in DSGE
models e.g. Amato and Laubach (2003), Smets and Wouters (2003), Ambler
et.al. (2011), Carlsson and Westermark (2011) and Gali et.al.(2012). In all
the new Keynesian formulations the wage Phillips curve assumes a similar
form to the price Phillips curve in that the forward-looking term appears on
the right hand side. This result has been criticised by Mankiw (2001) and
Asada et.al. (2006) for generating counter-factual ination dynamics. The
presence of the forward-looking term on the right hand side of the wage and
price Phillips curves thus remains a challenge for the new Keynesian model.
The contribution of this paper is twofold. Firstly, we provide the microfoun-
dations for the backward-looking Keynesian wage-price spiral. As pointed
out by Fuhrer (1995), there seems to be consensus in Phillips curve litera-
ture that backward-looking Phillips curves lack microfoundations. Our pa-
per provides microfoundations that make the forward-looking term appear
on the left hand side, thereby providing theoretical grounds for "the return
of the backward-looking Phillips curve". In this sense, this paper responds
to the criticism of backward-looking Phillips curves that have been levelled
by Gali et.al. (2001). As in Gali (2011) we are able to explicitly provide a
structural interpretation of the parameters of our model, thereby providing
an optimisation-based competing perspective to the new Keynesian view.
Secondly, we estimate the backward-looking wage-price spiral for a set of
developed and emerging markets to test if the model ts the data.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 derives the Keynesian price and
wage Phillips curves from microfoundations. Section 3 provides empirical
evidence of the model. Section 4 concludes.
2. Staggered wage-price setting and wage-price Phillips curves
2.1 Staggered price-setting
Assume identical rms that operate in an environment where variations in
prices are of such a magnitude that they do not signicantly a¤ect the level
of demand faced by each rm. We index each rm in this environment by
j: Since rms are identical, we assume that the price set by each rm is the
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same as the aggregate price level Pt. Further assume, along the lines of Batini
et.al. (2005), xed input requirements in production such that : Xit = iYjt,
where Xit is the amount of non-labour input i required in production and
i is the input requirement coe¢ cient. The representative rm engages in
one-period contracts so that, at a point in time t, it produces real output Yjt
and contracts to sell a fraction of this output  p at price Pt in time t + 1.
The rest of the output (1   p)Yjt and the increment Yjt+1 will be sold at
Pt+1.
The fraction  p is analogous to the Calvo (1983) probability of no price
change and is thus a measure of price rigidity. In our instance the  p applies
to output produced by rms and not to rms. We can then write the real
revenue of the rm at time t as follows:
Rpjt = Yjt + (1   p)Yjt 1 +  p

Pt 1
Pt

Yjt 1 (1)
where Rpjt is real revenue. Eq. (1) is derived from noting that Yjt = Yjt +
Yjt 1, i.e. current output is incremental output plus past output. Over and
above production costs, the rm incurs losses due to lack of price exibility
imposed by the one-period contract. The assumption that there are costs
associated with contracts is due to Rotemberg (1982) and is used by new
Keynesian economists as an alternative to the Calvo-based derivation of the
Phillips curve (see e.g. Batini et.al.(2005), Fuhrer et.al.(2009:16), Ascari
et.al.(2011) and Guender (2011)). Assume an amount equal to p of last
period output is demanded at the current price but the rm can only sell it
at last periods price because of the contract. Then the real loss from the
contract is:
pjt =  pp

Pt   Pt 1
Pt

Yjt 1; (2)
where p > 0. The rms objective is to maximise discounted expected
prots, given the nominal wage and demand Yjt by choosing the optimal
price. This problem can be stated as follows:
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max
Pt
jt = E
t
1X
k=0
k
 
Rpjt+k  
Wt+kLjt+k
Pt+k
  Yjt+k
Pt+k
nX
i=1
iPit+k  pjt+k
!
(3)
where jt is real aggregate prots of the rm, Wt is the nominal wage, Ljt
is the level of employment which is determined by demand, given the real
wage, Pit is the price of input i and n is the number of non-labour inputs
and  is the discount factor. The rst order condition for price-setting yields
the following relationship:
  p
 
1 + p
Pt 1
Pt

Yjt 1 +
WtLjt
Pt
+
 
nX
i=1
iPit
Pt
+ FpE
t

Pt
Pt+1
!
Yjt = 0;
(4)
where we have set Fp =  p
 
1 + p

for compactness. Denote the labour
share in rm j by Sjt, we can then write eq.(4) as follows:
E
t
(1 + bpt+1) 1 Yjt = 1

(1 + bpt) 1 Yjt 1   YjtFp
 
Sjt +
nX
i=1
i
Pit
Pt
!
; (5)
where bpt denotes the price ination rate. Linearising eq.(5) around the steady
state and aggregating across rms we obtain the following Phillips curve
relation:
E
t
bpt+1 = apbpt + asest + a0yeyt   a"yeyt 1 + nX
i=1
apiepit; (6)
where est is the level deviation of the labour share from the steady state, epit
is the level deviation of real input prices from the steady state and eyt is the
percentage deviation of output from potential. In order to explicitly express
the coe¢ cients in eq.(6) in terms of all the underlying structural parameters,
we explicitly write Fp so that:
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ap =
1

, as =
(1 + bp0)2
 p
 
1 + p
 , a"y = (1 + bp0) ; api = (1 + bp0)2 i p  1 + p
a
0
y = (1 + bp0) + (1 + bp0)2 p  1 + p +
nX
i=1
api,
Eq.(6) is di¤erent from the new Keynesian Phillips curve in four respects.
Firstly, the forward-looking term is now on the left hand side. Secondly,
the output gap appears on the right hand side together with the labour
share. Thirdly, eq.(6) exhibits speed-limit e¤ects directly from the optimi-
sation exercise. Fourthly, in contrast to new Keynesian derivations, ination
persistence arises from optimisation in the context of one-period contracts as
opposed to persistence being a result purely of rule-of-thumb price setting.
We now turn to the structural interpretation of the parameters. If all output
is sold at current prices, i.e. no contracts, the Phillips curve becomes vertical
since  p = 0. In this instance prices are fully exible. This result is consistent
with the idea that in the long run, where prices are fully exible, the Phillips
curve assumes a vertical shape. This result is analogous to the e¤ect of
the Calvo probability parameter on the slope of the new Keynesian Phillips
curve (see the coe¢ cient of marginal cost in Gali and Gertler (1999) and Gali
(2000) in particular). Furthermore, if there is an increase in p the slope of
the Phillips curve would fall. The intuition for this is that current prices
do not fully adjust to "excess demand" because part of current output is
contracted at previous period prices.
Flowing from this interpretation, it follows that even if rms enter into one
period contracts, i.e. 0 <  p < 1, if in period t the portion of aggregate
demand that is due to customers who are willing and able to pay at cur-
rent prices does not exceed (1   p)Yt 1 + Yt, then the contract will not
e¤ectively generate price rigidity. This is the case because rms could meet
aggregate demand at prevailing market prices. Thus as long as p > 0 the
contract will e¤ectively create price rigidity. We therefore interpret the com-
bination  p
 
1 + p

as a measure of "e¤ective price rigidity".
Our price Phillips curve features speed-limit e¤ects captured by lagged out-
put gap. The recognition of this term in Phillips curve literature is high-
lighted by Mehra (2004) and Gordon (2011). Mehra in particular nds that
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the inclusion of the change in the output gap in the hybrid specication
boosts the signicance and size of the backward-looking term in the new
Keynesian model. Gordon mentions the role of lagged excess demand terms,
with their zigzag signs. Assume that E
t
bpt+1 = bpt+1 + t+1, where E
t
t+1 = 0.
Then we can write eq.(4) as:
bpt = apbpt 1 + asest 1 + a0y   a"y eyt 1 + a"yeyt 1 + nX
i=1
apiepit 1   t (7)
Eq.(7) is the structural Keynesian Price Phillips curve. It explains the ob-
servation by Mehra (2004), although he conducts his analysis within the new
Keynesian setup, that the omission of supply shocks may be responsible for
the nding that the output gap is irrelevant to ination dynamics. If supply
shocks are omitted, then
nX
i=1
api does not appear in a
0
y, this biases the output
gap parameter downwards. This point is also made by Gordon (2011). If
the labour share is not included, the output gap parameter is further biased
downwards.
We now consider rms that use a rule-of-thumb to set prices. At each point
in time, a fraction of rms p sets prices in an optimal way whilst the rest
uses some rule-of-thumb. This assumption is similar to the new Keynesian
derivation of the hybrid Phillips curve (Gali and Gertler, 1999). By assuming
that the aggregate price level is the geometric average of the price set by
optimising and rule-of-thumb rms, we can write the ination rate aggregate
price index as:
bpt = pbpot + (1  p) vpt (8)
where bpot is the optimal price ination rate and t = 1m mX
j=1
bpt j is the indexing
variable used by rule-of-thumb rms and vp is the indexation parameter.
Our indexation rule follows Smets and Wouters (2003) and Christiano et
al. (2005) in postulating an autoregressive ination rule-of-thumb. However
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Smets and Wouters, and Christiano et al. assume a restrictive rule for non-
optimising rms wherein these rms set prices with consideration only of one-
lag ination. Our formulation follows Gali (2011), who also uses the moving
avarage to construct a smoother indexing variable. Zhang and Clovis (2010)
also argue for higher lags for the indexing variable, since they nd that with
the one-lag rule-of-thumb, estimations of the new Keynesian price Phillips
curve generate serially correlated residuals. Thus there is scope for long lags
in ination to enter the Phillips curve as in Gordon (1997, 2011), through
rule-of-thumb behaviour. Using eq.(7) for the optimal price ination rate,
we can write the price Phillips curve as follows:
bpt = papbpot 1 + (1  p) vpt + pasest 1 + p a0y   a"y eyt 1 + pa"yeyt 1
+p
nX
i=1
apiepit 1 + "pt (9)
where "pt =  ppt . Note that we can express eq.(9) in terms of nominal unit
labour cost by recalling that bst = bwt   bpt where bwt is nominal unit labour
cost ination and hence est = bwt  bpt+ est 1. Inserting this into eq.(9) we get
the following price Phillips curve:
bpt = papbpot 1 + (1  p) vpt + pasest 2 + p a0y   a"y eyt 1
+pa
"
yeyt 1 + pasbpt 1 + pas bwt 1 + p nX
i=1
iepit 1 + "pt (10)
Eq. (10) provides the micro-founded version of the traditional Phillips curve
in which rule-of-thumb rms are combined with optimising rms.
2.2 Staggered wage-setting
The derivation of the law of motion for nominal wages follows analogously
from the price-setting process. Assume that variations in nominal wages
are of such a magnitude that they do not signicantly a¤ect the aggregate
8
demand for labour. Workers engage in one-period contracts so that a fraction
of workers w contract to supply labour at period t+1 at nominal wagesWt.
The rest of the workers (1  w)Lt and newly employed workers Lt+1 will
sell their labour at a nominal wage Wt+1. These assumptions are similar to
the Calvo-type formulation presented by Gali (2011). Total real earnings by
workers Rwt can be written as follows:
Rwt =
Wt
Pt
Lt + (1  w)Wt
Pt
Lt 1 + w
Wt 1
Pt
Lt 1; (11)
We assume a fraction w of contracted labour is demanded at the current
nominal but workers can only sell it at last periods nominal wage. The real
loss from the contract is:
wt = ww

Wt  Wt 1
Pt

Lt 1 (12)
Workers strive to consume above some exogenously determined subsistence
level of consumption. Thus if workers consume at subsistence level, their
utility is zero and when they consume below the subsistence level, their utility
is negative. Let the number of baskets of goods and services that constitute
the subsistence level be an exogenously determined amount Cwst. Each basket
is purchased at a price Pt. Therefore workers want to maximise the di¤erence
between their real earnings and the cost of subsistence consumption. The
idea of a subsistence level of consumption in the utility function can be found
in the form of the reservation wage in Sen and Dutt (1995) and in Campbell
and Viceira (2002:177). The role of the reservation wage in explaining wage
dynamics is also analysed by Blanchard and Katz (1999). Workers seek to
solve the following problem:
max
Wt
Ut =
1X
k=0
k
	1 #wt
1  #w (13)
where 	t = Rwt   wt   Cwst, subject to eqs.(11) and (12). The rst-order
condition to this problem yields the following result:
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	 #wt

Lt
Pt
  w (1 + w)
Lt 1
Pt

+ w (1 + w) E
t
Lt
Pt+1
	 #wt+1 = 0 (14)
Multiplying by Pt
Lt
both sides, eq.(14) can be further simplied to get the
following:
	
0 #w
t

1 

w (1 + w)
1 + blt

=  w (1 + w) E
t
 
	
0 #w
t+1
1 + bpt+1
!
; (15)
where blt is the growth rate of employment and 	0t = 	tS0Y0 . We note from
eq.(15) that in the steady state:
1 

w (1 + w)
1 + bl0

=  w (1 + w) 
1 + bp0 ; (16)
which makes the sign of the left hand side of eq.(16) denitely negative. We
further note from this that w (1 + w) > 1. We linearise 	
0
t to get the
following equation:
e	0t  est + eyt   1
1 + bl0
 est + eyt   blt
1 + bl0
!
+
w
1 + bp0
est 1 + eyt 1   bpt
1 + bp0

+
1  w
1 + bl0
 est + eyt   blt
1 + bl0
!
  ww
1 + bl0
 est + eyt   blt
1 + bl0
!
+
ww
1 + bp0
est 1 + eyt 1   bpt
1 + bp0

  {cecwst (17)
where {c = C
w
s0
S0Y0
. Collecting like terms together and exploiting eq.(16) yields
the following:
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e	0t    Fw1 + bp0 (est + eyt) + F
w
1 + bl02blt +
Fw
1 + bp0 (est 1 + eyt 1)
  F
w
(1 + bp0)2 bpt   {cecwst (18)
where for compactness Fw = w (1 + w) > 1+bl0, is our measure of e¤ective
nominal wage rigidity. Since we assume xed non-labour input requirements
in production, we can write the production function as follows:
Yt = AtL

t
"
nY
i=1
(iYt)
i
#1 
; (19)
where we have assumed that the capital stock is xed by normalising it to
unity and, as in King et al. (1988), we have set At = 1 in the steady state.
The reduced-form production function can be written follows:
Yt = A
0
tL

t ; (20)
where  = (1  )
nP
i=1
i,  = 1  and A
0
t =
 
At
nY
i=1
ii
! 1
1 
. It follows that
elt = eyt ea0t : By eliminating elt from eq.(18) and collecting like terms together
we obtain:
e	0t    Fw1 + bp0 (est + eyt) + F
w


1 + bl02eyt +
Fw
1 + bp0 (est 1 + eyt 1)
  F
w
(1 + bp0)2 bpt   wt (21)
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where wt = {cecwst + Fw
(1+bl0)2ea0t. We can therefore express the linearised
version of the rst-order condition eq.(15) as follows:
e	0t +
0B@ 1 + bp0
#w

1 + bl02
1CAeyt  ea0t = E
t
e	0t+1 + 1#w (1 + bp0)bpt+1

;
(22)
By exploiting eq.(16) and collecting like terms together, the rst-order con-
dition yields the following result:
E
t
est+1 = E
t

bpbpt+1 + b0yeyt+1   wt+1+ b0pbpt + b00yeyt + bsest (23)
where, by using the fact that

1+bp0
1+bl0

=

Fw+(1+bp0)
Fw

from eq.(16), we have
eliminated bl0 from the parameters:
bp =
1
#wFw  
1
 (1 + bp0) , b0p = 1 (1 + bp0) ; b0y =

1

+
(1 + bp0)
Fw   1

,
b
00
y =
1

+
(1 + bp0) (Fw + (1 + bp0))
(Fw)2 #w
 

1

+
(1 + bp0)
Fw

bs =
1

; wt+1 =

(1 + bp0) (Fw + (1 + bp0))
Fw2#w

ea0t + 1 + bp0Fw

wt+1;
Recall that the growth rate of the labour share is, by denition, bst = bwt  bpt.
Also by denition we know that bst = est  est 1 bst . Accordingly we can write
the deviation of the labour share from trend as: est = est 1+ bwt  bpt+ bst . We
can then express eq.(23) as follows:
E
t
bwt+1 = E
t
(1 + bp) bpt+1 + b0yeyt+1   wwt+1+b0p   bs bpt+b00yeyt+bs bwt+wwt+1
(24)
12
where wwt+1 =

wt+1 +E
t
bst+1. Eq.(24) di¤ers from the new Keynesian wage
Phillips curve in that the expectations term is on the left hand side. In
addition, future nominal unit labour cost ination depends on past nominal
unit labour cost ination and lags of changes in the output gap. Taking
eq.(24) one step backwards we get the following relationship:
bwt = (1 + bp) bpt + b0p   bs bpt 1 + b0yeyt + b00yeyt 1 + bs bwt 1 + "wt (25)
where "wt = 
ww
t   wt and wt is the expectational error. Eq.(25) is the struc-
tural Keynesian Wage Phillips Curve. Nominal unit labour cost ination
depends on a lag of itself, current price ination, lagged price ination, the
rate-of-change in the output gap, and the lag of the rate-of-change in the out-
put gap. In Gali (2011) nominal wage ination depends on expected future
nominal wage ination as in all new Keynesian formulations (e.g. Amato
and Laubach (2003), Woodford (2003, Chapter 3) among others), lagged in-
ation due to one-lag indexation and the current unemployment gap. It is
the dependence of current ination to expected future fundamentals that has
been the source of criticism of the new Keynesian price Phillips curve (see
Asada.et.al.(2006) and Rudd and Whelan (2007)). The new Keynesian wage
Phillips curve inherits the weaknesses of the new Keynesian price Phillips
curve, which are not present in our model.
Our model of the wage-price dynamics further claries the role of the nom-
inal wage Phillips curve in traditional Keynesian Phillips curve literature.
Gordon (2011) relies on the reduced-form single-equation triangle model on
the grounds that wage-wage inertia is not signicant and furthermore follows
Sims (1987) in dispensing with the wage Phillips curve on the grounds that
separate wage and price Phillips curves cannot be identied. On the other
hand Fair (2000, 2008) and Flaschel et.al. (2001) among others, insist on the
importance of separate wage and price Phillips curves because these improve
accuracy in describing the ination process. In our case, to remove the wage-
wage inertia is impossible, since its coe¢ cient is the inverse of the discount
factor. Thus, our derivation of the Keynesian wage and price Phillips curves
provides structural grounds for the relevance of both curves in describing
ination dynamics.
13
Suppose w = 0, which means that Fw = 0, then wage Phillips curve be-
comes vertical. In this instance there are no contracts in the labour market
and nominal wages are perfectly exible. If w increases, i.e. the share of
labour that is demanded at current wages but is contracted at previous wages
increases, then nominal wages will respond less to the business cycle. The
wage Phillips curve becomes atter because b
0
y will fall. Thus the parameters
of our wage Phillips curve have consistent structural interpretation similar
to that of Gali (2011).
Eq.(25) can be expressed in terms of the unemployment rate. In order
to do this we recall from eq.(20) that output is a function of employment.
By implication potential output is a function of the labour force. Denote
potential output by Y t and the labour force by Nt. Therefore, similar to
Gali (2011), the level of employment is simply (1  ut)Nt, where ut is the
unemployment rate under the assumption of active search. It follows that
we can write the output gap as eyt = eat eut, which is the inverse of a simple
Okuns law. Therefore we can write the wage Phillips curve as:
bwt = (1 + bp) bpt+b0p   bs bpt 1  b0yeut + b00yeut 1+bs bwt 1 wwt (26)
where wt = 
ww
t +
 
b
0
yeat + b00yeat 1. Eq.(26) is similar to the wage Phillips
curve in Gali (2011), except that Galis formulation generates lags of the un-
employment by appealing to an empirical AR(2) process that drives the un-
employment rate in the case of the US. In our case, this AR(2) process arises
from the optimisation process. We now introduce rule-of-thumb workers. At
a point in time a fraction of workers w sets nominal wages in an optimal
way whilst the rest uses the rule-of-thumb. Rule-of-thumb workers set their
nominal wages such that the nominal unit labour cost evolves according to:
WtLt
Yt
= (1 + t)
w Wt 1Lt 1
Yt 1
(27)
where t is the moving average of the price ination rate and w > 0 is the
indexing parameter. Assume the aggregate nominal unit labour cost index is
a geometric average of the optimal nominal unit labour cost and the one set
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by rule-of-thumb rms, where w is the fraction of workers who set nominal
wages optimally. The optimal nominal unit labour cost evolves according to
eq.(26). Consequently, we can write the nominal wage Phillips curve as:
bwt = w (1 + bp) bpt + w b0p   bs bpt 1   w b0yeut + b00yeut 1
+wbs bwot 1 + (1  w) wt + wwt ; (28)
where wwt =  wwwt +(1  w) "wt and bwot is the optimal nominal unit labour
cost ination rate. Eqs.(7) and (26) or eqs.(10) and (28) constitute the wage-
price spiral similar to the one proposed by Chiarella and Flaschel (2000),
Flaschel et.al. (2001) and Asada et.al.(2006). These authors di¤er slightly
with the formulation by Fair (2008) in that they incorporate the unemploy-
ment rate in the wage Phillips curve and the rate of capacity utilisation in
the price Phillips curve. Fair on the other hand, argues that the wage-price
Phillips curves must be specied in log levels and not in terms of ination
rates and that the empirically relevant demand pressure is the unemployment
rate. Eqs.(7) and (26) can be easily written in level terms, in line with Fairs
suggestion and the production function can be used to replace the output
gap in eq.(7) with the unemployment rate.
3. Empirical results
We are now in a position to estimate the parameters of our wage-price spiral
and to check how well it ts the data. For purposes of this exercise we
consider six developed and six emerging market economies. For the six
developed economies we have: the United States, United Kingdom, Canada,
Germany, France and Australia. For the six emerging market economies we
have: Brazil, Mexico, Poland, Turkey, South Korea and South Africa. Data
is drawn from the International Financial Statistics database and where there
are gaps, we used the OECD database and country statistical o¢ ces. The
data is quarterly with a sample from 1975:12012:2 for developed economies.
For emerging markets the data starts from 19952012:2. Ination is measured
using the CPI, supply shocks are measured by consumer prices for energy,
food and the import price deator, all drawn from the OECD database.
Real output is measured by real GDP. Percentage deviations from trend are
derived using the HP-lter.
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One problem with estimation of optimisation-based models is that of "free
parameters". Chari et.al.(2009) and Fair (2012) raise this problem in their
critical review of new Keynesian models. In Gertler et al. (2008) three
parameters are calibrated. Gali (2011) takes the inverse of the Frisch labour
supply elasticity as the free parameter. In both these studies, the "zero
steady state ination rate" assumption is imposed. In our case, the discount
rate, steady state ination rate, labour share and the inverse of the Okun
co-e¢ cient are the free parameters. Table 1 reports the calibration that we
use to estimate the model for each country.
Table 1: Calibrated parameters
 bp0 S0  1
Developed Economies
Australia 1 0:05 0:44 0:54
Canada 1 0:04 1:10 0:43
Germany 1 0:03 1:10 0:37
France 1 0:05 1:88 0:37
United Kingdom 1 0:05 1:04 0:34
United States 1 0:04 1:04 0:45
Emerging Markets
Brazil 1 0:06 0:08 0:30
Mexico 1 0:08 0:53 0:30
Poland 1 0:06 0:53 0:30
South Africa 1 0:07 0:53 0:31
Korea Republic 1 0:04 0:71 0:24
Turkey 1 0:32 1:57 0:30
Notes: Index of the labour share, Index of real unit labour cost
The challenge with our formulation is that we cannot separately identify
the parameters  p and p. We thus estimate the measure of e¤ective price
rigidity. The calibration in Table 1 allows us us to estimate the following
set of parameters

p; p, i,
 
 p
 
1 + p
 1
. In the case of the nominal
wage Phillips curve, we recall that  = (1  )
nP
i=1
i and  = 1  . We
note that  is the production function based, structural parameter that is
the inverse of the parameter that underlies Okuns Law. To calibrate  we
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follow Ball et al.(2012), who estimate Okuns Law for a number of coun-
tries . In some of the countries, e.g. the US and the UK, indices of the
labour share are reported. In such cases we calibrate the parameter to be
the mean value of the index over the sample period. The last column of Table
1 presents the calibration for . This allows us to estimate the parameter
set
 
w, #
 1
w , (w (1 + w))
 1 , w

.
Note from eq.(25) that prices drive wages contemporaneously, while from
eq.(7) wages drive prices with a lag. Given the recursive structure of the price
and nominal wage Phillips curves, we estimate the eq.(9) and the output gap
version of eq.(28) using non-linear least squares. We also note that eq.(9)
features bpot 1 on the right hand side and eq.(28) features bwot 1 on the right
hand side. In order to implement the estimation, we use bpt 1 and bwt 1 as
proxies. Lastly we mention that estimates of the nominal wage Phillips curve
for South Africa and Poland yielded unreasonably large and insignicant
results for # 1w . We then calibrated this parameter for these countries to be
0.15, in line with other emerging market economies.
Tables 2 and 3 present estimates of the Phillips curves. In both developed
and emerging market economies, the baseline price Phillips curve rejects the
inclusion of supply shocks. We also nd that in general, there is substantial
price indexation, with a co-e¢ cient above 0.9. This is substantially higher
than the estimate by Smets and Wouters (2003). Our measure of e¤ective
price rigidity carries the wrong sign and is not signicant in Canada and
France. The same result can be observed in the case of Brazil and Mexico.
In the case of these Latin American economies, these results may be due to
data quality but from the theoretical point of view, in so far as the composite
rigidity parameter is not signicant, they suggest that prices are rigid in
these economies. For the rest of the economies e¤ective price rigidity has the
correct sign and is highly signicant.
In relation to the nominal wage Phillips curve, we observe that in general
wage indexation is rejected in developed economies, except partially for Ger-
many and Australia when the 4-quarter moving average is used. This result
is not consistent with the estimates of Smets and Wouters (2003) and Gali
(2011). In emerging market economies, wage indexation is rejected in Brazil
and Mexico. We also nd that the inverse of e¤ective nominal wage rigidity is
higher in emerging markets, implying that wages are more exible in emerg-
ing markets than in developed markets. Across developed and emerging
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markets, we also nd that nominal wages are more exible than prices. This
result is in line with Amato and Laubach (2003) and Flaschel et al.(2007)
for the case of the United States.
In terms of the empirical t of the Phillips curves, we observe that in general
they exhibit a high level of R2. However, the results also show that there is
signicant serial correlation among the residuals (see the 2 (4) probability
in all the regressions). In relation to the nominal wage Phillips curve, this
serial correlation can be partially explained to be the result of persistence
in subsistence consumption and productivity shocks. Gali (2011) attributes
possible serial correlation in the error term of the wage Phillips curve to
persistent variations in the markup. In relation to the price Phillips curve,
the serial correlation signals that more work still has to be done to ensure
that the baseline model accounts for systematic variation in the error term.
Overall however, our wage-price Phillips curves t the data well and are
admitted by data from most of the cross section of countries.
Conclusion
Backward-looking wage and price Phillips curves have been severely criti-
cised for their lack of microfoundations. Consequently, their estimated pa-
rameters lack structural interpretation. Despite this major weakness, these
Phillips curves have been found to be stable across samples (Fuhrer (1995)
and Gordon (2011)). In addition, backward-looking Phillips curves have
been found to outperform the new Keynesian Phillips curves when it comes
to ination forecasting (Fair (2008), Gordon (2011)). On the other hand, es-
timates of the micro-founded new Keynesian Phillips curves have been found
to yield counter-intuitive signs of the marginal cost or output gap parameter
(see Rudd and Whelan (2007), Mazumder (2012) and Abbas and Sgro (2012)
among others). In addition estimates of the new Keynesian Phillips curve
have been found to su¤er from weak identication (Mavroeidis (2004, 2005),
Martins and Gabriel (2009)).
In this paper we have derived the backward-looking wage and price Phillips
curves from microfoundations. We are thus able to provide a structural in-
terpretation of the parameters of the backward-looking Phillips curves. In-
terestingly, some of the empirical observations by scholars in the eld e.g.
Mehra (2004) and Gordon (2011), have a straightforward structural inter-
pretation. For example, these authors observe that the exclusion of supply
18
shocks in Phillips curve estimations biases the parameter on the demand
pressure term downwards. We are able to explain this by the link between
output and the input requirements of rms. Secondly, some Phillips curve
estimations yield a negative sign on the demand pressure variable. We are
able to link this phenomenon to the role played by speed-limit e¤ects in a
misspecied Phillips curve.
Our paper therefore contributes to the literature by addressing the long-
standing criticism of backward-looking Keynesian Phillips curves. In so
doing, it posits an optimisation-based competing perspective on ination dy-
namics to the new Keynesian perspective. Estimations of the wage-price
Phillips curves show that this model ts the data very well. Across the
board, we nd wages to be e¤ectively more exible than prices and we nd
that nominal wages are more exible in emerging markets than in devel-
oped economies. Furthermore, the nominal wage Phillips curve rejects wage
indexation in developed economies and in some emerging markets.
References
Abbas S., Sgro P.M., 2011. New Keynesian Phillips curve and ination
dynamics in Australia. Economic Modelling 28, 20222033.
Amato J., Laubach T., 2003. Estimation and control of an optimization-
based model with sticky prices and wages. Journal of Economic Dynamics
and Control 27, 11811215.
Ambler S., Guay A., Phanouf L., 2012. Endogenous business cycle propaga-
tion and the persistence problem: The role of labor-market frictions. Journal
of Economic Dynamics and Control 36, 4762. (2012)
Asada T., Chen P., Chiarella C., Flaschel P., 2006. Keynesian dynamics and
the wage-price spiral: A baseline disequilibrium model. Journal of Macro-
economics 28, 90130.
Ascari G., Castelnuovo E., Rossi L., 2011. Calvo vs Rotemberg in a trend
ination world: An empirical investigation. Journal of Economic Dynamics
and Control 35, 18521867.
Ball L., Leigh D., Loungani P., 2012. Okuns law: Fit at 50? Paper presented
at 13th Jacques Polak Annual Research Conference. International Monetary
Fund, November 89.
Bardsen G., Jansen E.S., Nymoen R., 2004. Econometric evaluation of the
new Keynesian Phillips curve. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics
66, Supplement, 03059049.
19
Batini N., Jackson B., Nickell S., 2005. An open-economy new Keynesian
Phillips curve for the UK. Journal of Monetary Economics 52, 10611071.
Blanchard O.J., Katz L.F., 1999. Wage dynamics: Reconciling theory and
evidence. American Economic Association Papers and Proceedings (May),
6974.
Calvo G.A., 1983. Staggered prices in a utility maximizing framework. Jour-
nal of Monetary Economics 12, 383398.)
Campbel J.Y., Viceira L.M., 2002. Strategic asset allocation. Oxford, Oxford
University Press.
Carlsson M., Westermark A., 2012. The new Keynesian Phillips curve and
staggered price and wage determination in a model with rm-specic labor.
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 35, 579603.
Chari V.V., Kehoe P.J., McGrattan E.R., 2009. New Keynesian models: not
yet useful for policy analysis. American Economic Journal Macroeconomics
1, 242266.
Chiarella C., Flaschel P., 2000. High order disequilibrium growth dynamics:
Theoretical aspects and numerical features. Journal of Economic Dynamics
and Control 24, 935963.
Christiano L.J, EichenbaumM., Evans C.L., 2005. Nominal rigidities and the
dynamic e¤ects of a shock to monetary policy. Journal of Political Economy
113, 145.
Erceg C.J., Henderson D.W., Levin A.T., 2000. Optimal monetary policy
with staggered wage and price contracts. Journal of Monetary Economics
46, 281313.
Fair R.C., 2000. Testing the nairu model for the United States. Review of
Economics and Statistics 82, 6471.
Fair R.C., 2008. Testing price equations. European Economic Review. 52,
14241437.
Fair R.C., 2012. Has macro progressed? Journal of Macroeconomics 34,
210.
Flaschel P., Gong G., Semmler W., 2001. A Keynesian macroeconometric
framework for the analysis of monetary policy rules. Journal of Economic
Behaviour and Organization 46, 101136.
Fuhrer J.C., 1995. The Phillips curve is alive and well. New England Review.
March/April, 4156.
Fuhrer J.C., Kodrzycki Y., Little J.S., Olivei G.P., 2009. The Phillips curve
in historical context. in Fuhrer J.C. et al. (ed). Understanding ination and
20
the implications for monetary policy: A Phillips curve retrospective. MIT
Press, Cambridge MA.
Gali J., Gertler M., 1999. Ination dynamics: A structural econometric
analysis. Journal of Monetary Economics 44, 195222.
Gali J., 2000. The return of the Phillips curve and other recent developments
in business cycle theory. Spanish Economic Review 2, 110.
Gali J., 2011. The return of the wage Phillips curve. Journal of the European
Economic Association 9, 436461.
Gali J., Smets F., Wouters R., 2011. Unemployment in an estimated new
Keynesian model. NBER Working Paper 17084.
Gertler M., Sala L., Trigari A., 2008. An estimated modetary DSGE model
with unemployment and staggered nominal wage bargaining. Journal of
Money, Credit and Banking 40, 17131764.
Gordon J., 1997. The time-varying nairu and its implications for economic
policy. Journal of Economic Perspectives 11, 1132.
Gordon R.J., 2011. The history of the Phillips curve: Consensus and bir-
cation. Economica 78, 1050.
Guender A., 2011. The timeless perspective vs. discretion: Theory and
monetary policy implications for an open economy. Journal of International
Money and Finance 30, 16381658.
Huang K.X.D., Liu Z., 2002. Staggered price-setting, staggered wage-setting,
and business cycle persistence. Journal of Monetary Economics 49, 405433.
King R.G., Plosser C.I., Rebelo S.T., 1988. Production, growth and business
cycles I: The basic neoclassical model. Journal of Monetary Economics 21,
195232.
Mankiw N.G., 2001. The inexorable and mysterious tradeo¤ between ina-
tion and unemployment. Economic Journal 111, C45C61.
Martins L.F., Gabriel V.J., 2009. New Keynesian Phillips curves and po-
tential identication failures: A generalized empirical likelihood analysis.
Journal of Macroeconomics 31, 561571.
Mavroeidis S., 2005. Identication in forward-looking models estimated by
GMM, with an Application to the Phillips Curve. Journal of Money, Credit
and Banking 37, 421-448.
Mavroeidis S., 2004. Weak identication of forward-looking models in mon-
etary economics. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics. 66, Supple-
ment, 03059049.
Mazumder, S., 2012. The new Keynesian Phillips curve and the cyclicality
of marginal cost. Journal of Macroeconomics 32, 747765.
21
Mehra Y.P., 2004. The output gap, expected future ination and ination
dynamics: Another look. Topics in Macroeconomics 4, Article 17.
Rotemberg J., 1982. Monopolistic price adjustment and aggregate output.
Review of Economic Studies 49, 517531.
Rudd J., Whelan K., 2007. Modelling ination dynamics: A critical review
of recent research. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 30 Supplement,
155170.
Rudd J., Whelan K., 2005. New tests of the new-Keynesian Phillips curve.
Journal of Monetary Economics 52, 11671181.
Sbordone A., 2001. An Optimzing model of US wage and price dynamics.
Rutgers University Working Paper.
Sen A., Dutt A., 1995. Wage bargaining, imperfect competition and the
markup: Optimizing microfoundations. Economics Letters 48, 1520.
Sims C.A., 1987. Comment. Brookings Papers of Economic Activity 1, 117
120.
Smets F., Wouters R., 2003. An estimated dynamic stochastic general equi-
librium model of the Euro Area. Journal of the European Economioc Asso-
ciation 1, 11231175.
Woodford M., 2003. Interest and Prices. New Jersey, Princeton University
Press.
Zhang C., Clovis J., 2010. The new Keynesian Phillips curve of rational
expectations: A serial correlation extension. Journal of Applied Economics
13, 159179.
22
T
ab
le
2:
E
st
im
at
es
of
th
e
P
ri
ce
an
d
W
ag
e
P
hi
lli
ps
C
ur
ve
s
(A
dv
an
ce
d
E
co
no
m
ie
s)
(E
qs
.(
9)
an
d
(2
8)
)
A
us
tr
al
ia
C
an
ad
a
G
er
m
an
y
Fr
an
ce
U
S
U
K
P
ri
ce
P
hi
lli
ps
C
ur
ve

(4
)

(8
)

(4
)

(8
)

(4
)

(8
)

(4
)

(8
)

(4
)

(8
)

(4
)

(8
)
 p
0:
29

(0
:0
8
)
0:
78

(0
:0
6
)
0:
37

(0
:0
5
)
0:
66

(0
:0
4
)
0:
23

(0
:0
3
)
0:
48

(0
:0
4
)
0:
28

(0
:0
5
)
0:
63

(0
:0
4
)
0:
70

(0
:0
5
)
0:
73

(0
:0
5
)
0:
40

(0
:0
6
)
0:
83

(0
:0
5
)

p
1:
00

(0
:0
2
)
0:
94

(0
:0
6
)
1:
01

(0
:0
1
)
1:
02

(0
:0
3
)
0:
99

(0
:0
1
)
0:
95

(0
:0
3
)
0:
99

(0
:0
1
)
0:
97

(0
:0
2
)
0:
94

(0
:0
4
)
1:
01

(0
:0
4
)
1:
00

(0
:0
2
)
0:
97

(0
:0
8
)
1

p
(1
+

p
)
0:
31
(0
:5
9
)
0:
28

(0
:1
0
)
 0
:0
9
(0
:0
6
)
 0
:0
4
(0
:0
4
)
0:
25

(0
:1
3
)
0:
20

(0
:0
8
)
0:
03
(0
:0
3
)
 0
:0
1
(0
:0
2
)
0:
14

(0
:0
5
)
0:
19

(0
:0
6
)
0:
37

(0
:1
4
)
0:
17

(0
:0
8
)
 i
0:
35
(0
:5
2
)
 0
:1
8
(0
:1
5
)
 0
:4
8
(0
:1
9
)
 0
:3
1
(0
:1
6
)
0:
66
(0
:4
4
)
0:
33
(0
:2
8
)
R
2
0:
95
0:
92
0:
96
0:
94
0:
94
0:
89
0:
99
0:
98
0:
90
0:
92
0:
95
0:
94
D
W
0:
91
1:
47
1:
29
1:
52
1:
12
1:
47
1:
08
1:
22
1:
46
1:
54
1:
09
1:
60

2
(4
)z
0:
00
0:
00
0:
00
0:
00
0:
00
0:
00
0:
00
0:
00
0:
00
0:
00
0:
00
0:
00
W
ag
e
P
hi
lli
ps
C
ur
ve
 w
0:
55

(0
:0
6
)
0:
56

(0
:0
6
)
0:
88

(0
:0
4
)
0:
90

(0
:0
4
)
0:
80

(0
:0
4
)
0:
82

(0
:0
4
)
0:
78

(0
:0
5
)
0:
83

(0
:0
5
)
0:
85

(0
:0
6
)
0:
86

(0
:0
5
)
1:
00

(0
:0
4
)
1:
00

(0
:0
4
)
#
 1 w
0:
18

(0
:1
0
)
0:
23

(0
:0
9
)
0:
40

(0
:2
0
)
0:
35

(0
:1
0
)
 0
:1
5
(0
:1
5
)
0:
00
4
(0
:0
7
)
0:
05

(0
:0
3
)
0:
08

(0
:0
2
)
0:
34

(0
:1
1
)
0:
34

(0
:1
1
)
0:
17

(0
:0
7
)
0:
26

(0
:1
3
)
1

w
(1
+

w
)
1:
63

(0
:5
6
)
1:
77

(0
:5
6
)
0:
56

(0
:2
4
)
0:
94

(0
:2
4
)
1:
01

(0
:2
2
)
1:
19

(0
:2
1
)
1:
80

(0
:2
4
)
1:
83

(0
:2
2
)
0:
64

(0
:1
7
)
0:
65

(0
:1
7
)
1:
05

(0
:2
6
)
0:
70

(0
:2
6
)

w
0:
39

(0
:2
2
)
0:
21
(0
:1
8
)
 0
:8
3
(0
:8
5
)
 1
:8
9
(1
:0
0
)
1:
07

(0
:5
1
)
0:
36
(0
:4
1
)
0:
16
(0
:2
2
)
 0
:2
5
(0
:2
7
)
 0
:3
6
(0
:4
4
)
 0
:5
7
(0
:4
9
)
R
2
0:
75
0:
75
0:
94
0:
94
0:
90
0:
89
0:
95
0:
95
0:
93
0:
93
0:
94
0:
95
D
W
1:
98
2:
02
1:
60
1:
59
1:
98
1:
99
1:
66
1:
79
1:
86
1:
90
1:
59
1:
56

2
(4
)z
0:
00
0:
00
0:
00
0:
00
0:
00
0:
00
0:
00
0:
00
0:
00
0:
00
0:
00
0:
00
N
ot
es
:
S
td
er
ro
rs
in
p
ar
en
th
es
es
,
 S
ig
n
i
ca
nt
at
5%
,
z P
ro
b
ab
il
it
y,

(m
)
d
en
ot
es
m
-q
u
ar
te
r
m
ov
in
g
av
er
ag
e.
23
T
ab
le
3:
E
st
im
at
ed
P
ri
ce
an
d
W
ag
e
P
hi
lli
ps
C
ur
ve
s
(E
m
er
gi
ng
M
ar
ke
ts
)(
E
qs
.(
9)
an
d
(2
8)
)
B
ra
zi
l
M
ex
ic
o
P
ol
an
dy
S.
A
fr
ic
ay
K
or
ea
R
ep
.
T
ur
ke
y
P
ri
ce
P
hi
lli
ps
C
ur
ve

(4
)

(8
)

(4
)

(8
)

(4
)

(8
)

(4
)

(8
)

(4
)

(8
)

(4
)

(8
)
 p
0:
11
(0
:0
9
)
0:
83

(0
:0
5
)
0:
01
(0
:0
6
)
0:
27

(0
:0
7
)
0:
71

(0
:1
1
)
0:
82

(0
:0
7
)
0:
33

(0
:0
6
)
0:
85

(0
:0
6
)
0:
10

(0
:0
5
)
0:
30

(0
:0
7
)
0:
21

(0
:0
9
)
0:
35

(0
:0
8
)

p
0:
86

(0
:0
3
)
0:
19

(0
:1
1
)
0:
79

(0
:0
2
)
0:
58

(0
:0
2
)
0:
69

(0
:1
2
)
0:
45

(0
:1
7
)
1:
00

(0
:0
1
)
1:
01

(0
:0
6
)
0:
94

(0
:0
2
)
0:
83

(0
:0
5
)
0:
99

(0
:0
1
)
0:
94

(0
:0
2
)
1

p
(1
+

p
)
 1
:3
8
(4
:6
7
)
0:
71
(0
:7
7
)
1:
64
(1
2
:3
)
0:
03
(0
:1
8
)
0:
16

(0
:0
9
)
0:
14

(0
:0
7
)
0:
18
(0
:1
4
)
0:
14

(0
:0
7
)
0:
24
(0
:3
3
)
0:
34

(0
:1
8
)
0:
19

(0
:1
1
)
0:
13

(0
:0
6
)
 i
 0
:3
2
(0
:2
7
)
0:
46
(0
:2
4
)
R
2
0:
87
0:
81
0:
99
0:
99
0:
98
0:
98
0:
91
0:
89
0:
92
0:
77
0:
99
0:
96
D
W
0:
59
1:
82
0:
86
1:
49
1:
02
1:
16
1:
30
1:
80
1:
24
1:
14
1:
53
1:
15

2
(4
)z
0:
00
0:
00
0:
00
0:
00
0:
00
0:
00
0:
00
0:
00
0:
00
0:
00
0:
00
0:
00
W
ag
e
P
hi
lli
ps
C
ur
ve
 w
0:
92

(0
:0
5
)
0:
93

(0
:0
5
)
0:
97

(0
:0
4
)
0:
97

(0
:0
4
)
0:
55

(0
:1
0
)
0:
67

(0
:1
0
)
0:
66

(0
:0
8
)
0:
54

(0
:0
9
)
0:
73

(0
:0
6
)
0:
80

(0
:0
6
)
0:
88

(0
:0
5
)
0:
87

(0
:0
5
)
#
 1 w
0:
15

(0
:0
3
)
0:
13

(0
:0
2
)
0:
16

(0
:0
5
)
0:
16

(0
:0
5
)
0:
15
y
(0
:0
0
)
0:
15
y
(0
:0
0
)
0:
15
y
(0
:0
0
)
0:
15
y
(0
:0
0
)
 0
:2
7
(0
:2
6
)
 0
:1
3
(0
:1
4
)
 0
:0
4
(0
:0
3
)
 0
:0
4
(0
:0
3
)
1

w
(1
+

w
)
2:
97

(0
:3
9
)
2:
67

(0
:3
5
)
3:
60

(0
:6
9
)
3:
60

(0
:6
9
)
0:
86
(0
:7
4
)
0:
86
(0
:7
4
)
1:
34
(1
:3
8
)
0:
68
(1
:3
6
)
1:
91

(0
:6
8
)
2:
16

(0
:6
5
)
1:
54

(0
:0
9
)
1:
55

(0
:0
9
)

w
 4
:2
4
(3
:5
5
)
 3
:2
0
(2
:7
3
)
 1
0:
80
(1
6
:2
0
)
 1
5:
74
(2
1
:3
4
)
1:
14

(0
:2
0
)
0:
69

(0
:2
9
)
0:
59
(0
:3
9
)
0:
90

(0
:2
2
)
2:
39

(0
:9
0
)
2:
14

(1
:0
9
)
1:
30

(0
:4
2
)
1:
22

(0
:3
5
)
R
2
0:
91
0:
91
0:
93
0:
93
0:
94
0:
93
0:
76
0:
78
0:
86
0:
84
0:
96
0:
96
D
W
1:
30
1:
32
1:
82
0:
72
2:
09
2:
12
2:
14
2:
09
1:
65
1:
66
1:
13
1:
13

2
(4
)z
0:
00
0:
00
0:
00
0:
00
0:
00
0:
00
0:
00
0:
00
0:
00
0:
00
0:
00
0:
00
N
ot
es
:
S
td
er
ro
rs
in
p
ar
en
th
es
es
,
 S
ig
n
i
ca
nt
at
5%
,

S
ig
n
i
ca
nt
at
10
%
,
z P
ro
b
ab
il
it
y,

(m
)
d
en
ot
es
m
-q
u
ar
te
r
m
ov
in
g
av
er
ag
e
24
